Emancipation from the Arrogant and Rude American Imperialists:
Lessons on
(Paper prepared for the International Conference on Philippine Studies, PSSC, 23-26 July 2008—not for citation)
Gonzalo A. Campoamor II
Doctoral Candidate,
Abstract
The so-much-longed-for independence from American colonial domination was but one of the promises the Japanese Military Administration presented to the Filipinos since the occupation of
There are two general premises related to the topic. First, that the Second World War was a significant objective condition to the various independence movements in South and
The second premise, despite being arguably controversial, has never really been adequately discussed by historians. This attributes to it being arrested as something assumed or taken for granted. The premise is that wartime Japanese propaganda was a failure. Agoncillo, the foremost Filipino war historian of his time argues that the Japanese massive propaganda “never succeeded in making the Filipinos believe in the soundness or even in the mere correctness of their views (1965,338).” Most historians echo Agoncillo’s view.
In the course of research for my dissertation, I have come to the conclusion that Japanese propaganda can best be analyzed and evaluated by how it might have mattered in the places it had actually reached (i.e. Manila and other town centers) and how it might have affected the people it most likely appealed to (i.e. the elite and the middle bourgeoisie). Given these, it is hard to imagine how something as important as independence as well as the relatively valid sort of alternative independence offered by the Japanese could not have had any significant appeal and influence to the Filipino leadership in the 1940s. It is true that Laurel, Vargas, Aquino and the rest of the wartime Filipino government never perceived the independence proposition as a genuine political state but as a way to soften the Japanese oppressive apparatuses. But is it really that difficult to imagine the political elite having been drawn to the counter-culture
Soon after its occupation of
However, soon after the January broadcast, Japanese propaganda would appear variable and undecided about granting independence to Filipinos.[2] When Vargas, the Greater Manila Mayor, and other Filipino leaders were demanded a response to the occupation message of the Commander-In-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, the 10 January draft they came up with after several days of debates contained the following:
“We beg to inform the Commander-in-Chief that, as requested and having in mind the independence and freedom of the country, we are ready to assist the [Japanese] Military Administration (Malay, 1967).”[3]
Lt. Col. Maeda Masami, Chief of Staff of Gen. Honma Masaharu, immediately responded against the inclusion especially of the word “independence” in the draft. After two days of less than cordial meetings with the Japanese military officials, a portion of the final copy of the said reply eventually read:
“We beg to inform the Commander-in-Chief that, in compliance with his advice, and having in mind the great ideals, the freedom, and the happiness of our country, we are ready to obey to the best of our ability and within the means at our disposal the orders issued by the Imperial Japanese Forces…”[4]
The word “independence” noticeably was replaced with the less ambitious “great ideals” and the highly subjective and nearly enigmatic term “happiness.” Japanese propagandists were so conditioned in using the term that even after the
At the onset of the occupation,
As intimated by Hitomi, propagation to liberate a colonized nation inevitably entails at least a certain level of racial provocation—making race and independence and their mutualism a necessity. In early 1942, occupying forces were luring the Filipinos into the Pan-Asian new order, this time known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (daitōa kyōiken). Japanese propaganda was outright clear on the cultural and ideological means with which this war was to be conducted. It was the united Asiatics/Orientals’ war of liberation against the West (Occidentals). The best representations of this appeal are leaflets dropped over the battlefields of Bataan and
War time propaganda consisted of various themes such as
“Looking back in retrospection,
Race is not included in the extensional definition of independence, but several propaganda works by both Allies and Axis openly utilized it especially in the latter episodes of the Pacific War. It was because of this tendency of racial imposition why Dower (1986) hastily termed the global conflict as a “Race War.” I do not totally agree with Dower’s formulation.[11] In propaganda studies, invocation of race can only be considered as a rational requisite to the war time rhetoric and not the cause of it. Furthermore, it appears that both
As it turns out, Japanese propagandists were compelled to exploit the racial issue as most of its target territories were colonies of American and Western nations. Despite therefore of
It was widely published by the Japanese that in order for the Filipinos to achieve the so-much-longed-for independence, they had to fulfill the three requirements that Tojo had lined-up during his 1943 visit: peace and order, economic self-sufficiency, and the return to true Oriental spirit (see for example Porter, 1943: 109-112). It was during this year that both the guerrillas and the Japanese forces were suffering from tactical and strategic losses brought by the lingering war time social and economic crisis. Of the three requirements, only the third holds no objective leverage to Japanese military strategy. Bulk of the work in the check and balance for the “true Oriental spirit” were left therefore to the propagandists. Towards this end, Japanese propagandists exploited the long history of emancipatory and nationalist struggle of the Filipinos.
One of the first leaflets printed by the 14th Army Propaganda Corps shows a Japanese soldier lighting a cigarette for a Filipino soldier (indicating confidence in battle and camaraderie) while American soldiers carrying a war torn stars and stripes flag scurry away from battle.[14] A January 1942 poster in
You had been striving with every sacrifice and effort to establish an
Several other posters would consistently invoke the Filipino emancipatory struggle against the Americans. A 1943 propaganda plan by the 14th Army Information Department designates 16 July to 4 August as the period to prepare for the remembrance of the American military occupation of Manila (beigun senryō-bi senden jōbi, see Watari Shūdan Hōdō-bu, 1996, 287).[15] A late 1944 poster commemorated the 1899 Malolos Congress declaration of War against the Americans. Japanese propaganda though, fell short on stating the incomparable American atrocities during the Filipino-American War of 1899-1902.[16]
Where the anti-American issue was found inevitable, the independence issue took some precious time before it was finally used for practical propaganda purposes. Of all the Japanese, only Tojo was consistent in mentioning Philippine independence to Filipinos. The first time was during the hype created by the unexpected ease at taking out
Miki has been a relatively unknown entity in the Philippine academe.[17] Recent research though points to his important role not only in Japanese propaganda but in
Not until 26 June 1943 would the Southern Military Government (Nanpō no Gunsei) provide a clear “guiding principle” on Philippine independence (Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjō Senshi-bu, 1985, 52-53). By 14 October 1943, the
As I entered your reception room, tears flowed from my eyes and I felt strengthened and inspired and said, ‘One billion Orientals; one billion peoples of Greater East Asia! How could they have been dominated, a great portion of them, particularly by
There undoubtedly had been strong anti-American sentiment in the political elite during the 1940s. Quezon, not so long ago, was a Major in Aguinaldo’s Philippine Independence Army during the Filipino-American War (Enosawa, 1940). Laurel, who was to become the President of the Japanese-sponsored independence, was the son of one of the signatories of the Malolos Constitution in 1899. Sotero Laurel Sr. was captured by the Americans during the Filipino-American War, and died in an American concentration camp. The problem arises though in the fact that most of the memoirs published by the political elite after the war are filled with retractions of their part in the occupation—making it practically impossible to use their war time speeches and writings as reliable texts. But in the same fashion as some historians’ attempt to look for subtle anti-Japanese insertions in their speeches and writings, there undoubtedly was a possibility of Filipino leaders (sans the Japanophiles) having been genuinely open to the Japanese counter-culture.
Works Cited
Abe, Yutaka and Gerardo de Leon. 1944. Dawn of Freedom. Tōhō Productions.
Agoncillo, Teodoro A. 2001. The Fateful Years:
____________________. 1984. The Burden of Proof: The Vargas-Laurel Collaboration Case.
Bōeichō Bōei Kenkyūjō Senshi-bu (防衛庁防衛研究所戦史部編著, War History Department of the National Institute of Defense Studies, NIDS). 1985. Nanpō no Gunsei Shiryō-shū (南方の軍政資料集, Collection of Materials of the Southern Military Government).
Dower, John W. 1986. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.
Enosawa G.H. (Hisashi). 1940. Manuel L. Quezon: From Nipa House to Malacanan.
Ienaga Saburō. 1978. The Pacific War 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on
Kiyoshi Mahito (清真人), Tsuda Masao (津田雅夫), Kameyama Sumio (亀山, 純生), Muroi Michihiro (室井美千博), and Tairako Tomonaga (平子友長). 2008. Isan toshite no Miki Kiyoshi (遺産としての三木清, Miki Kiyoshi’s Legacy).
Malay, Armando J. 1967. Occupied
Mao Tsetung. 1971. Selected
Maruyama Masao. 1969. Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics. Edited by Ivan Morris.
Nihon no Firipin Senryō-ki ni kansuru Shiryō Chōsa Fōram(日本のフィリピン占領期に関する史料調査フォーラム). 1994. Nihon no Firipin Senryō: Intabyū Kiroku (日本のフィリピン占領:インタビュー記録, Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: A Record of Interviews).
Porter, Catherine. 1943. “
Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji. 1967. The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Monograph Series No. 12.
Terami-Wada Motoe. 1984. “The Cultural Front in the
Wainright, General Jonathan. 1946. General Wainright’s Story: The Account of Four Years of Humiliating Defeat, Surrender, and Captivity.
Watari Shūdan Hōdō-bu (渡集団報通部, 14th Army Propaganda Corps). 1996. Daijūyon-gun Gunsendenhan: Senden Kōsaku Shiryō Shū (第十四軍軍宣伝班:宣伝工作資料集, Compilation of Propaganda Materials of the 14th Army Propaganda Corps). Two Volumes compiled and summarized by Hitomi Junsuke (人見潤介), Nakano Satoshi (中野聡), and Terami Motoe (寺見元恵).
[1] FDR, in a reply to Quezon, quickly reassures its Filipino counterpart American support citing the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law. At the same time, FDR reminds Quezon of the horrible Japanese track record in
[2] No posters, leaflets, and other popular forms of propaganda I found would mention the word independence until mid-1943. Unlike
[3] Italics provided by the me. A detailed record of the proceedings of those meetings can be read from Malay, 1967. The inclusion of the term independence was reiterated by Benigno Aquino.
[4] Italics provided by the researcher.
[5] The Japanese term shiawase (幸せ) is different from its closest English counterpart, “happiness”. Shiawase is more closely related to “fate” than to a state of emotion. I am not an authority on this. I believe it warrants a more exhaustive anthropological study.
[6] Tojo also talked about this during the 81st Diet in 28 January 1943: “Substantial progress is being made in the degree of cooperation…and in the restoration of internal peace and security. Under these circumstances,…it is contemplated to put into effect the statement made previously on the question of Philippine independence in the shortest possible time.”
[7] At that time, Hitomi had the rank First Leiutenant (Chū-i) and was the head of both the External Propaganda Division (Taigai Senden-bu) and the Information Division (Jōhō-bu) of the 14th Army Propaganda Corps.
[8] Based on an interview conducted by Nakano Satoshi, in Nihon no Firipin Senryō-ki ni kansuru Shiryō Chōsa Fooram, 1994, 481-538.
[9] Original message in Tagalog: “Totoo na ang sundalong Filipino ay may lakas loob para bumaril sa oficiales na Americano upang lumaya.”
[10] Retrieved from a pamphlet, italics are mine. No date was indicated in this pamphlet but I believe the speech was made around July 1943.
[11] My view on the causes of the war is more closely related to what Gluck (1992) refers to as the “view of progressives and mostly Leftists” from 1945 until the 1970s—i.e., the causes of the war as “thoroughly systematic, involving not only state but society, not only Showa but Meiji, imperialism not only reactive but aggressive, and an emperor system not only exempt from responsibility but exemplifying it.” Unfortunately, the book where Gluck’s article is used as an introduction, while attempting to plot the different point of views on the Pacific War, fail to expound or even represent this so-called “Leftist view”. The book though correctly pointed to works of Ienaga (1968) and Maruyama (1969).
[12] This was according to the comments to a draft entitled “Basis for detailed plan for propaganda into the Japanese Empire”penned by the OWI. Document retrieved from the National Archives at
[13] Parameters of racism may be recognized from the mere citation of two different races (i.e. Orientals and Occidentals) to the denigration of a particular race. Both Japanese and American propagandists may be guilty on those extreme parameters especially after the brutal island battles and savage hand-to-hand combats. In fact, it can be surmised that the rate of brutality was directly proportional to the rate of racism in both Allied and Axis propaganda. But this requires a lengthy discussion and deserves a separate paper.
[14] According to Terami-Wada, 1984, 105, 15,000 copies of this leaflet were disseminated in
[15]
[16] It turns out that Japanese propaganda officers and civilians as well as the entire Japanese forces were not aware of this. Basic texts about the
[17] With the exception of Yu-Jose (1992) who briefly mentions of Miki’s work in the
[18] This manifesto also appeared in bilingual (Tagalog and English) poster form. The poster measures 106.5X76.5cm and can be retrieved from the University of the Philippines Japanese Occupation Papers Collection.